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Abstract
China’s rank falling in the Global Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum has aroused the domestic scholar’s
controversy. Based on the data provided by the Global Gender Gap Report, this article will describe the gender inequality
in China by comparing its overall index scores and scores in the fields of economic participation and opportunity, educa-
tional attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment with other countries, and then examining the reasons
for China’s falling in rank through the score changes of sub-dimensions and indicators. Analysis of the data suggests that
China has not kept up with the rate of improvement in the overall index, and in the four fields, compared to the original
112 countries, the upper-middle income countries, and the Asian and Pacific countries. Over the 13 years covered by the
report, China’s score experienced a rapid improvement from 2006 to 2009 and a decline after 2013. China’s high sex ratio
at birth, further expansion of gender inequality in active life expectancy, and an enlarged gender gap in secondary educa-
tion caused China’s lagging overall score and ranking. In addition, the inclusion of measures such as secondary education
enrollment, political empowerment, and other indicators also led to the backward ranking of China to some extent.
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1. Introduction
Gender inequality is a basic dimension of social inequal-
ity, which is related to the development opportunities
and well-being of women and men in society. In order
to measure the gender gap around the world, the inter-
national community has opened up multiple indicator
systems, including the Gender Development Index, the
Gender Empowerment Measure, the Gender Inequality
Index (GII), the UNESCO’s Gender Parity Index, and
the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Gender Gap
Report (GGGR). Among such index systems, the Global
GenderGap Index (GGGI) from theWEF has had themost
significant impact. In order to capture the magnitude of
gender-based disparities and tracking their progress over
time, the GGGI comprehensively and systematically eval-
uates the gender gap in the fields of economic partici-
pation, educational attainment, health and survival, and
political empowerment of participating countries. The
GGGR has thus become the main source of information
reflecting the gender inequality around the world.
After the release of the GGGR in 2018, China’s rank-
ing dropped from 63 in 2006 to 103, which caused great
controversy in China. Chinese scholars’ arguments on
China’s ranking mainly include two aspects: First, it was
argued that the indicators are unreasonable and some
data sources have not been updated in time (Tang, 2019;
Yang, 2018; Zheng, 2019). Secondly, it was also suggested
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 10–22 10
that it is too simple to directly compare the data of
2006 and 2018, because the countries participating in
the assessment in 2006 and 2018 are different (Tang,
2019). The GGGR reflects the gender equality of a coun-
try through two indicators—the score and ranking. The
former reflects the absolute level of gender inequality
in a country: The higher the score, which ranges from 0
through 1, the smaller the remaining gender gap. The lat-
ter is a relative indicator. In comparison, the ranking is
more likely to be influenced by the number of participat-
ing countries. This article will focus on the question of
why China’s ranking on the world’s foremost indicator of
gender inequality has fallenmarkedly, from 63 to 103 be-
tween 2006 and 2018. How to understand the trend in
the overall GGGI for China during this period and which
factors directly lead to these changes will be discussed in
this article.
In order to take account of the fact that the countries
participating in the assessment in 2006 and 2018 are not
the same, this study will take the 112 countries (includ-
ing China) participating in the assessment in both years
as a sample to study the relative position of China’s gen-
der gap. Accordingly, using the data from the 112 origi-
nal countries provided in the GGGR 2006 and 2018, this
study mainly focuses on descriptive statistics, reviews
the changes of China’s scores and rankings in overall
and each field according to each indicator, and compares
them with the world average (the average level of 112
original countries), countries at the same level of devel-
opment (upper-middle income countries), and Asian and
the Pacific countries. Based on the comparison, this ar-
ticle will make a more comprehensive judgment on the
situation of gender inequality in China. In this process,
the researchers will combine the relevant research and
data released by the Chinese government to confirm or
question the conclusions based on GGGR data. The data
sources of this study mainly include The Global Gender
Gap Report (2006–2018) published on thewebsite of the
WEF. The final part of this article reflects on the selection
of the indicators used in the GGGI, in combination with
the factors that lead to China’s backward ranking.
2. China’s Overall Index
China’s gender gap index experienced a great change
from 2006 to 2018—its overall score increased from
0.656 in 2006 to 0.673 in 2018with rank falling from63 to
103. Among the 112 original countries, China ranked 82
in 2018, with a fall of 19 places. The increasing score in-
dicated that China’s overall gender inequality has slightly
improved, but the falling rank indicated that its speed of
improvement was slower than the world average. From
2006 to 2018, the overall score in 112 countries im-
proved by 0.040, an increase of 6.0%; China grew by
0.017, an increase of 2.6%. Over the same period, the in-
dex for upper-middle income countries, of which China
is one, rose by 0.040, an increase of 6.0%, while that for
Asian and the Pacific countries increased by an average
of 0.034, an increase of 5.0% (see Table 1). At the same
time, China’s gender gap index in 2018 was below than
0.677, the average level of the new added 37 countries.
In terms of China’s change trajectory (as shown in
Figure 1), an initial rapid reduction in the gender gap was
followed by a slow increase. During 2006–2009, China’s
overall score increased rapidly by 0.035 (5.3%), while
the average score for the other 112 countries partici-
pating in the assessment over the same period rose by
0.017 (2.6%). The year 2013 was an important turning
point. From 2013 to 2018, China’s score decreased by
0.018 (2.6%) while that for the original countries par-
ticipating in the assessment increased by 0.023 (3.4%).
China’s score was basically equal to that of the 112 origi-
nal countries in 2013 but by 2018 had fallen to just 95.8%
of the average level of those original countries.
3. China’s Performance on the Four Sub-Indexes
There are four subfields to the index: economic partici-
pation and opportunity; educational attainment; health
and survival; and political empowerment. In the four
fields, the difference in educational attainment and eco-
nomic participation and opportunity between China and
112 original countries was not significant in 2018, while
the difference in health and survival and political em-
powerment was large. China’s score in health and sur-
vival was 93.9% of the average level and 74.5% in politi-
cal empowerment.
During 2006–2018, China’s scores for economic par-
ticipation and opportunity fluctuated rapidly. In general,
the index increased by 0.032 (5.2%), which was less than
for the 112 countries (0.052), and for upper-middle in-
come countries (0.061; see Table 2). China ranked 53 in
2006, 86 out of 149 countries, and 67 out of the 112
original countries in 2018, with a drop of 14 places. The
Table 1. Comparison of overall scores between China and other countries.
2006 2018 Change Rate of change (%)
China 0.656 0.673 0.017 2.6
The 112 original countries 0.662 0.702 0.040 6.0
The upper-middle income countries 0.664 0.704 0.040 6.0
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.674 0.708 0.034 5.0
37 countries added after 2006 — 0.677 — —
Source: WEF (2006, 2018).
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Figure 1. Time series comparison of GGGI. Source: WEF (2006, 2008–2018).
change trajectory in this field was similar to the overall
score (see Figure 2). From 2006 to 2009, the gender in-
equality in this field improved rapidly, with a score in-
crease of 0.075 (12.1%), then came to decline after 2009,
with a decrease of 0.043 points or 6.2% until 2018. In
2009, China scored 1.11 times the average of the 112
original countries, and in 2015, whereas China’s score
had fallen to the average level of those original countries.
In 2018, the overall inequality in educational attain-
ment in China was slightly higher than the average.
During 2006–2018, the improvement in gender inequal-
ity in China’s education field was not significant, with an
increase of just 0.001 (0.1%). In 2006, in terms of the gen-
der gap of educational attainment, China ranked 78, 111
out of 149 countries in 2018 and 88 out of the 112 orig-
inal countries, a decline of 10 places. During the same
period, the average index scores for educational attain-
ment for the 112 original countries, the upper-middle in-
come countries, and Asian and the Pacific countries in-
creased by 0.025 (2.7%), 0.009 (0.9%), and 0.023 (2.4%)
respectively. In contrast, China’s improvement wasmuch
slower than the world average and the countries with
the same development level. In terms of trend, China’s
index for educational attainment also mirrored its over-
Table 2. Comparison of the scores of China and other countries in four sub-indexes.
2006 2018 Change Rate of change (%)
Economic participation China 0.621 0.653 0.032 5.2
and opportunity The 112 original countries 0.598 0.650 0.052 8.7
The upper-middle income countries 0.593 0.654 0.061 10.3
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.664 0.699 0.035 5.3
37 countries added after 2006 — 0.649 — —
Educational attainment China 0.957 0.958 0.001 0.1
The 112 original countries 0.940 0.965 0.025 2.7
The upper-middle income countries 0.973 0.982 0.009 0.9
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.961 0.984 0.023 2.4
The 37 countries added after 2006 — 0.935 — —
Health and survival China 0.936 0.915 −0.021 −2.2
The 112 original countries 0.973 0.973 0 0
The upper-middle income countries 0.972 0.975 0.003 0.3
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.971 0.969 −0.002 −0.2
37 countries added after 2006 — 0.971 — —
Political empowerment China 0.111 0.164 0.053 47.7
The 112 original countries 0.140 0.219 0.079 56.4
The upper-middle income countries 0.127 0.206 0.079 62.2
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.116 0.180 0.064 55.2
37 countries added after 2006 — 0.152 — —
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Figure 2. Time series comparison of economic participation and opportunities. Source: WEF (2006, 2008–2018).
all score, with rapid growth of 0.023 (2.4%) from 2006
to 2008, while the average increase for the other 112
countries during the sameperiodwas 0.008 (0.9%). From
2009 to 2015, China’s score for gender equality in educa-
tional attainment was far higher than the average, but it
started to decrease markedly from 2016, falling by 0.03
points (3%) by 2018 (as shown in Figure 3).
Health and survival was the only field in which
China’s gender gap increased almost continuously be-
tween 2006 and 2018, with its score correspondingly
decreasing by 0.021. Over the same period, the aver-
age score of 112 countries and the upper-middle in-
come countries increased but only slightly. Moreover,
the score for the Asian and Pacific countries also de-
creased but less so (0.002), suggesting that this pattern
might be partly related to cultural factors. In terms of
the change trajectory, China’s score fell rapidly between
2009 and 2010 and after 2014. By 2018, it was the last of
all countries on this component of the overall index.
In the framework of gender inequality constructed
by GGGR, China’s gender gap with respect to politi-
cal empowerment showed the greatest improvement.
That said, according to the data provided by GGGR,
gender inequality in political empowerment was higher
than the average for all countries and for those at the
same income level. During 2006–2018, the index score
for China increased by 0.053 (47.7%), while that for
the 112 original countries increased by an average of
0.079 (56.7%) and that for the upper-middle income
countries increased by 0.079(62.7%); China’s improve-
ment was much slower than the world average and the
countries with the same development level.
China’s gender gap in economic participation, ed-
ucational attainment, and political empowerment was
smaller than the 37 new added countries. However, the
gender gap in health and survival was enlargedwhich led
to backward ranking of China.
4. Index of Indicators in the Four Fields
4.1. Economic Participation and Opportunity
Female participation in the labor force in Chinawasmuch
above average in 2006 (see Table 3). However, during
the period 2006–2018, China’s gender gap relating to
labor force participation increased rather than narrow-
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Figure 3. Time series comparison of educational attainment. Source: WEF (2006, 2008–2018).
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Table 3. Comparison of the scores of China and other countries in economic participation and opportunity.
Economic participation and opportunity 2006 2018 Change Rate of change (%)
Labor participation China 0.84 0.831 −0.009 −1.1
The 112 original countries 0.685 0.748 0.063 9.2
The upper-middle income countries 0.670 0.722 0.052 7.8
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.74 0.791 0.051 6.9
Wage equality for similar work China 0.61 0.643 0.033 5.4
The 112 original countries 0.637 0.640 0.003 0.5
The upper-middle income countries 0.630 0.617 −0.013 −2.1
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.708 0.709 0.001 0.1
Estimated earned income China 0.66 0.621 −0.039 −5.9
The 112 original countries 0.528 0.588 0.060 11.4
The upper-middle income countries 0.472 0.601 0.129 27.3
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.593 0.638 0.045 7.6
Legislators, senior officials, China 0.14 0.201 0.061 43.6
and managers The 112 original countries 0.359 0.469 0.110 30.6
The upper-middle income countries 0.366 0.497 0.131 35.8
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.352 0.466 0.114 32.4
Professional and technical China 0.81 1.00 0.190 23.5
workers 112 original countries 0.794 0.867 0.073 9.2
The upper-middle income countries 0.848 0.953 0.105 12.4
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.834 0.918 0.084 10.1
ing, as indicated by a 1.1% fall in the index, while the
two indicators of the remuneration gap take on differ-
ent trends. The improvement in wage equality for similar
work was much greater than elsewhere although even
by 2018 China had not caught up with other countries
in Asia. However, the gap in estimated earned income
in China which in 2006 was much narrower than aver-
age subsequently expanded during this period, with the
score decreasing by 0.039 (5.9%), while that of other
countries rose causing China’s ranking to drop from 19
in 2006 to 73 out of 149 countries in 2018. Among the
112 countries, it ranked 58 in 2018. During the same pe-
riod, the score for the 112 original countries increased
by 0.060 (11.4%), that of the upper-middle income coun-
tries by 0.129 (27.3%), and Asian and the Pacific coun-
tries by 0.045 (7.6%). Although women’s participation
rate in the labor market remains relatively high, the gap
between women and the men’s wage in the labor mar-
ket has widened, a finding confirmed by other research
examining the effects of the economic transformation (Li
& Li, 2008).
The two indicators intended to capture the advance-
ment gap, the percentage of, first, legislators, senior offi-
cials, andmanagers and, secondly, the percentage of pro-
fessional and technical workers who are women, have
both improved in China. In detail, the greatest improve-
ment occurredwith respect to professional and technical
workers, with an increase in the index of 0.190 (23.5%),
compared to smaller increased for the original 112 coun-
tries, the upper-middle income countries, and the Asian
and the Pacific countries, namely 0.073 (9.2%), 0.105
(12.4%), and 0.084 (10.1%) respectively. In this regard,
China has achieved gender equality, which could be at-
tributed to the rapid expansion of higher education in
China. However, in contrast, women in China are likely to
face higher barriers than those in other countries in ac-
quiring positions as legislators, senior officials, and man-
agers. In 2018, China scored 0.201 on this criterion and,
although the score increased by 0.061 (43.6%) between
2006 and 2018, China still lags behind the world aver-
age level and that of countries the same level of devel-
opment (as shown in Figure 4).
There is a basic contradiction in the gender gap in the
economic field, that is, on the one hand, the rapid reduc-
tion in gender inequality in the field of education leading
to improvement of women’s education level provide hu-
man capital sufficient forwomen to enter high-income in-
dustries; on the other hand, a rising income gap between
different genders for similar work, and women’s access
to managerial opportunities in the labor market remain-
ing low. The underlying reason may be increased occu-
pational gender segregation in the labor market since
the economic transformation (Deng & Ding, 2012; Wu
& Wu, 2009). The existing research finds that the higher
the degree of marketization, the greater the impact of
occupational gender segregation, and the higher the de-
gree of occupational segregation, the greater the gen-
der income gap (He & Wu, 2017). Occupational gender
segregation is essentially a kind of structural discrimina-
tion against women in the labor market, which can be di-
vided into horizontal occupational segregation and ver-
tical position segregation (Anker, 1997; Tong & Wang,
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Figure 4. Trend comparison of scores on legislators and senior officials. Source: WEF (2006, 2008–2018).
2013). According to Li and Li (2008), gender discrimina-
tion in China’s labor market since the economic transfor-
mation is likely to have shifted from the form of ‘same
work with different pay’ to a more implicit allocative dis-
crimination and to occupational segregation. Wu & Wu
(2009) found that gender segregation of industrial occu-
pations was the main determinant of the gender income
gap among urbanworkers in China. Also, within the same
industry, women are heavily concentrated at the bot-
tom of the job ‘pyramid’ structure such that 41% of the
gender income gap is caused by occupation segregation
(Qing & Zheng, 2013). Thus, these two forms of segrega-
tion explain thewidening gender gap in income in China’s
labor market, phenomena that have also been shown
to explain most of the earning disparities between men
and women in other countries (Cohen & Huffman, 2003;
Petersen & Morgan, 1995).
4.2. Educational Attainment
China’s educational gender gap resembles ‘spindles,’ that
is, the gaps in higher education and primary education
are relatively small, while those in secondary education
are slightly larger. From 2006 to 2018, the biggest im-
provement in the gender gap was in higher education,
with an increase in the index from 0.85 in 2006 to 1.00
in 2018, indicating that, in terms of enrollment rate,
China’s higher education has achieved gender equal-
ity. This is consistent with the education statistics is-
sued by the China’s Ministry of Education. From 2006 to
2018, the number of general full-time college students
in Higher Education in China increased from 17,388,441
to 28,310,348 (Ministry of Education of the People’s
Republic of China, 2006a, 2018a), a 2.63 times increase.
The proportion of full-time college students who are
women increased from 48.1% in 2006 to 52.5% in 2018.
Primary education also achieves gender equality with
the popularization of universal introduction of compul-
sory education. Based on the 1% sample survey data
of China in 2005, Fang (2009) found that with univer-
sal compulsory education, the gender gap in primary ed-
ucation in China had almost disappeared. The develop-
ment of economy, the process of industrialization, sub-
replacement fertility caused by family planning policy,
and the strong promotion of the Chinese government
have all contributed to the achievement of primary and
tertiary education.
It is the gender gap in secondary education enroll-
ment rate that has led to China’s overall score and rank-
ing in the field of education lagging behind that of other
countries. It can be seen fromGGGR data that during this
period, this score fell from 0.97 to 0.941 and the rank-
ing from 81 in 2006 to 130 out of 149 countries (102
among the original 112 countries) in 2018. The corre-
sponding change during the same period was positive
in most other countries; for the 112 original countries
it was 0.034 (3.6%), for upper-middle income countries
it was 0.008 (0.8%), and for Asian and the Pacific coun-
tries it was 0.018 (1.9%). Due to lack of data on the sec-
ondary education in China from 2013–2015, GGGR re-
ports that the gender gap remained largely stable, grad-
ually increasing after 2016 (as shown in Figure 5). This
change was basically in line with the increase in female
enrollment in upper secondary education based on the
annual education statistics provided by the website of
China’s Ministry of Education, as shown in Figure 6.
While the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in secondary
education fell, the proportion of girls in regular senior
high schools increased year by year, from 46.8% in 2006
to 50.8% in 2018 (Figure 6). The gender structure in sec-
ondary education reflects the high sex ratio at birth, since
there is no strong evidence to suggest that it resulted
from a boy preference in terms of the admission to sec-
ondary education. On one hand, the admission to high
school requires passing a rigorous selective examination,
which largely ensures decisions on students’ admission
to high school are not influenced by gender preference.
The continuous proportion of regular senior secondary
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 10–22 15
20092008 2010
1
0.98
0.94
0.96
0.92
0.9
2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018201220072006
112 original countries China
The upper middle income countries Asian and Pacific countries
Figure 5. Trend comparison of scores on enrolment in secondary education. Source: WEF (2006, 2008–2018).
school pupils who are girls reflects the improvement in
girls’ educational performance which has exceeded that
of boys since 2015 (Figure 6). Moreover, regular senior
secondary schooling is preferred by students and parents
as it is the major channel for students to enter higher
education. The competition to access to regular senior
secondary schooling is therefore more severe than that
to enter secondary vocational education. On the other
hand, the lower threshold for entry to secondary vo-
cational schools means that there is no obvious obsta-
cle preventing girls from accessing secondary vocational
schools, therefore strongly suggesting that girls choose
to give up vocational education, preferring senior high
schools. Therefore, in theGGGR report, taking the gender
gap in enrollment into the whole secondary education as
the only indicator to measure the gender inequality in
secondary education is inappropriate in the Chinese case.
Finally, the literacy rate reflects the country’s long
run ability to educate women andmen in equal numbers.
China’s score was higher than the average level in 2018.
Moreover, during the period from 2006 to 2018, this indi-
cator for China rose faster (0.041; 4.5%) than that for the
112 original countries (0.020), the upper-middle income
countries (0.020), and the Asian and the Pacific countries
(0.024). Even so, China’s rank dropped from 81 place in
2006 to 94 out of 149 countries in 2018 (ranking 81 out
of 112 original countries).
4.3. Health and Survival
According to the GGGR, China’s performance with re-
spect to the health and survival indicators, as shown in
Table 4, falls far short of the world average. This is es-
pecially so for the sex ratio at birth, which measures
the phenomenon of ‘missing women’ prevalent in many
countries with strong son preference. The sex ratio for
China was the second lowest in 2006 and the last of 149
countries in 2018.
The sex ratio at birth is a basic indicator reflecting the
gender equality at birth. Shi (2013) reports that China’s
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Figure 6. Female percentage of enrollment in upper secondary education. Source: Ministry of Education of the People’s
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Table 4. Comparison of the scores on health and survival and political empowerment.
2006 2018 Change Rate of change (%)
Sex ratio at birth China 0.89 0.87 −0.02 −2.2
The 112 original countries 0.938 0.942 0.004 0.4
The upper-middle income countries 0.933 0.940 0.007 0.7
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.933 0.936 0.003 0.3
Healthy life expectancy China 1.03 1.019 −0.011 −1.1
The 112 original countries 1.044 1.043 −0.001 −0.0
The upper-middle income countries 1.051 1.052 0.001 0.1
Asian and the Pacific countries 1.049 1.046 −0.003 −0.3
Women in parliament China 0.25 0.332 0.082 32.8
The 112 original countries 0.217 0.346 0.129 59.4
The upper-middle income countries 0.229 0.375 0.146 63.8
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.191 0.276 0.085 44.5
Women in ministerial positions China 0.07 0.111 0.041 58.6
The 112 original countries 0.211 0.306 0.095 45.0
The upper-middle income countries 0.197 0.300 0.103 52.3
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.133 0.209 0.076 57.1
Years with female head of state China 0.03 0.076 0.046 153
(last 50) The 112 original countries 0.044 0.081 0.037 84.1
The upper-middle income countries 0.009 0.035 0.026 289
Asian and the Pacific countries 0.053 0.096 0.043 81.1
high sex ratio at birth is prevalent nationwide, and Shi
and Liu (2015) found that it increased between the 1990s
and 2010. The imbalance of sex ratio at birth is the re-
sult of the joint effect of male preference and fertility
policy. In response to the trend towards an aging pop-
ulation, the Chinese government, from 2013 to 2015, be-
gan to adjust the strict family planning policy and succes-
sively introduced a revised ‘one-child policy’ and ‘univer-
sal two-child policy.’ These policies are likely to reduce
the scope for gender selection in urban families, and thus
make it possible for China’s sex ratio at birth to decrease.
However, the GGGR data suggest that, against inspec-
tions, the sex ratio at birth worsened after 2014.
The other indicator used by GGGR tomeasure the dif-
ference of the health status by gender is active life ex-
pectancy. According to the data from GGGR, the gender
gap in China was relatively large, and further expanded
between 2006 and 2018. In 2006, China’s score was 1.03,
lower than the average of the original 112 countries and
the upper-middle income countries. China’s rank posi-
tion fell from 87 in 2006 to 132 out of 149 countries
in 2018, ranking 100 out of the original 112 countries
in 2018, having dropped 12 places. It is clear, therefore,
that active life expectancy contributed to China’s decline
on the overall GGGR Index (Figure 7).
There are limitations to using the healthy life ex-
pectancy and the sex ratio at birth as crucial indicators for
gender gap index of health and survival. Since women’s
healthy life expectancy is higher than men’s in almost
all countries (except Kuwait, Bhutan, and Bahrain), the
value of this indicator is questionable, both theoretically
and in practice. Also, since the sex ratio at birth is as-
signed a weight of 0.693 when calculating the index of
health and survival, all countries with high sex ratios at
birth are likely to rate low on the health and survival in-
dex (such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Vietnam, among
others; Zheng, 2019). China therefore rates poorly on the
heath and survival index largely because of its score on
sex imbalance at birth. It is easily visible that the sex ra-
tio at birth is heavily weighted and plays an pivotal role
in the index of the health and survival and so China (and
some other countries), which has(have) been at the low-
est level in the sex ratio at birth, tend to score poorly in
the health and survival index overall.
4.4. Political Empowerment
The GGGR uses three indicators to measure political em-
powerment gap between men and women in decision-
making at the highest level that is women in parliament,
women in ministerial positions, and the ratio of women
to men in terms of years in executive office (prime min-
ister or president) over the last 50 years. While all three
indicators of political empowerment show a certain im-
provement for China, for two of the three indicators it
was less than either. The growth rate of these two indica-
tors in Chinawas lower than theworld average or that for
upper-middle income countries between 2006 and 2018
(see Table 4). The exception was the index of the female
head of state (last 50).
China differs little from other countries in terms of
the number of women in Parliament, although between
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Figure 7. Time series comparison of gender gap index in healthy life expectancy. Source: WEF (2006, 2008–2018).
2006 and 2018 it slipped from above to below average
and relative progress has been particularly poor since
2014 (Figure 8). In terms of women in ministerial posi-
tions, China is much below average, and behind coun-
tries with an equivalent level of development (Figure 9).
Even in the best year, 2012, China’s score was only 48.9%
of the average; in 2018, the corresponding figure was
just 36.6%.
It has been argued that the GGGR embodies an elite
bias in the selection of female political empowerment
indicators (Yang, 2018) and that the indicators are too
narrowly focused on the highest level. In China, the ratio
of women’s participation is higher in local politics than
it is at parliamentary and ministerial levels. According
to the Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report Reports sub-
mitted by China under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women [CEDAW], 2012), women accounted for
11.0% and 13.7% at the provincial and 291 prefecture
(director-general) levels. Above the county level, women
held 16.4% of positions in 2009.
In the same year, not over a decade ago, 90.3% of
provinces, 89.5% of municipalities, and 88.4% of coun-
ties hadwomenwithin their leadership teams (Figure 10;
as seen in CEDAW, 2012). It shows an increasing trend of
the rate on female participation in local politics.
Article 6 of Election Law of the People’s Republic
of China for the National People’s Congress and Local
People’s Congresses at All Levels (Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress, 2015) states that
the National People’s Congress and local people’s con-
gresses at all levels should have an appropriate num-
ber of women’s representatives, and should continue
to gradually increase the proportion of women’s repre-
sentatives. In the past decade, the Chinese Government
has adopted a number of strategies to promote the
participation of women in all levels of management
and decision-making. The National Human Rights Action
Plan for 2009–2010 set a specific target regarding the
proportion of women in politics, i.e., “people’s con-
gresses, political consultative conferences and local gov-
ernments at all levels should have at least one female
member in their leadership” (Information Office of the
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Figure 8. Time series comparison of index in women in parliament. Source: WEF (2006, 2008–2018).
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Figure 10. Percentage of leading bodies of government departments at the provincial level that had female cadres. Source:
CEDAW (2012).
State Council, 2009). Thereafter, National Human Rights
Action Plan for 2016–2020 stated that the proportion
of women among the people’s congress representatives
and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
members at all levels should be gradually increased
(Information Office of the State Council, 2016).
However, the extent to which these strategies are be-
ing actively pursued and the legislation enforced is open
to debate. Considering the proportion of women in the
population versus the role they play in China’s economy
and society, Chinese women’s participation in political
empowerment remains a challenge. The overall propor-
tion of women in politics is obviously low, and there
are more women who are deputies than chiefs, partic-
ularly in Party committees and governments at the city
and county levels. It is suggested that the civil and po-
litical environment for women’s participation needs fur-
ther improvement.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
To conclude, China’s fall in rank position is not only re-
lated to a slower than average improvement, but also
to the choice of indicators. In addition, there has been
an expansion in the sample of countries with the ma-
jority of additional countries having higher scores than
China. Having witnessed a relative improvement from
2006 to 2013, when China had a score that was 2.9%
above the international average (114 countries) which
was due largely to a marked increase in score between
2006 and 2009, China has subsequently fallen behind
other countries, most notably between 2013 and 2014.
Like other countries, the gender gap was relatively
smaller in the fields of education and health, but be-
tween 2006 and 2018, China’s improvement in these two
fields was relatively slow or even stagnant. First, China’s
high sex ratio at birth and the further expansion of gen-
der gap in active life expectancy caused China’s overall
score and ranking to slip. It can be expected that with the
adjustment of China’s family planning policy, the high sex
ratio at birth in China will fall. Second, the widening gen-
der gap in secondary education is another important fac-
tor influencing the overall score. However, the current in-
dicators are too crude to reflect the actual gender strati-
fication. The distinction between regular high school and
vocational education is missed and with it evidence that
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girls, who are increasingly performing better than boys,
are choosing to attend higher status high school rather
than vocational education. Gender gap on the enroll-
ment in secondary education is influenced by the high
sex ratio at birth, which amounts to double counting.
The gender gap in China’s economic participation and
political empowerment continues to narrow, but gen-
erally speaking, the improvement is far lower than the
world average and for countries of a similar level of de-
velopment. Although there is a system of equal pay for
equal work and a high level of female labor participation,
the income gap remains and even further expands. One
possible reason is that China is still a patriarchal society
with men holding a lot of distributive resource, thereby
creating greater obstacles that inhibit women from pro-
gressing in high-income industries and serving in high-
income occupations.
Investigating the reasons for China’s fall in rank po-
sition by examining through the score changes of sub-
dimensions and indicators, some scholars have queried
the rationality of the choice of GGGR indicators. The fol-
lowing issues have been identified: First, there is concern
about the selection of indicators and their appropriate-
ness. As stated above, the life expectancy of women is
globally higher than that of men in almost all countries,
while the ratios of health and survival (91–98%) have
been fairly stable since 2006 suggesting a lack the sen-
sitivity (Zheng, 2019). A major difference between the
GGGR and the GII which was developed by the United
Nations Development Programme (2019), and on which
China ranked 39 out of 189 countries in 2018 rather than
113 out of 149, lies in the selection of health indicators.
The GII employs the maternal mortality ratio and the
adolescent birth rate to measure gender inequality in
health, rather than the sex ratio at birth and healthy life
expectancy. The GII and the GGGR differ little with re-
spect to indicators of education, labor market participa-
tion, and political empowerment, pointing to the impor-
tance of the measures of health inequality in explaining
the difference in rank order, and Zheng (2019) makes the
case that the indicators of health inequality adopted by
the GII are to be preferred. It can be argued that other
indicators are not well suited to circumstances in China.
For instance, the three indicators used by GGGR to mea-
sure political empowerment only reflect the highest lev-
els, while measure of enrollment in secondary education
confound high school and vocational education. Second,
there is concern about the substitution for absent data
and out of data lag, which may affect the accuracy of the
indicator and its results. For example, the substitute in-
dicator for the enrollment rate of secondary education
adopted by GGGR (2018) is the percentage of female stu-
dents in secondary education: 47.1% girls. Considering
that the indicator of the percentage of female students
in secondary education reflects the continuing influence
of high sex ratio at birth, this formulation may not nec-
essarily measure the gender inequality of accessibility in
secondary education.
In summary, despite concerns about the selection of
some indicators and data sources, the GGGR of the WEF
provides a significant reference for China to analyze and
track its gender gap. The slow improvement of China’s
gender equality only emphasizes the need for a joint ef-
fort on behalf of the government and the whole society.
Gender inequality is not only deeply embedded in a coun-
try’s politics, economy, education and health, but also in-
fluenced by culture, social norms, patriarchy, and the dis-
tribution of power and authority.
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